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Ian Ayres∗ and Gregory Klass∗∗ 
Rabbi Hillel was once challenged by a gentile to teach “the whole 
Torah” while the challenger stood on one leg.1  The sage responded with 
his version of the Golden Rule: “That which is hateful to you, do not 
unto another: This is the whole Torah.  The rest is commentary.”2  The 
story exemplifies both how succinctly a sagacious interlocutor can sum-
marize a vast tract, and the extreme impatience of many listeners. 
Professors Robin Kar and Margaret Radin, in their thought-provoking 
article Pseudo-Contract and Shared Meaning Analysis,3 have proposed 
that courts ignore vast portions of contractual writings: the unread 
standard terms ubiquitous in modern consumer and other transactions.4  
Before enforcing such boilerplate text, a court should “imagine that all 
of the written and digital text exchanged during contract formation is 
converted into oral form and takes place in a face-to-face conversation 
between the relevant parties.”5  It should then ask: “Could this boiler-
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 1 Philologos, The Rest of “The Rest Is Commentary,” FORWARD (Sept. 24, 2008), https:// 
forward.com/culture/14250/the-rest-of-the-rest-is-commentary-02564 [https://perma.cc/F9K4-
MFBP]. 
 2 Id.  One of us implemented a version of this one-legged constraint by trying to summarize in 
a video everything one needs to know about retail investing while standing on one leg.  Ian Ayres, 
Concise Advice for Investing While Standing on One Leg, FORBES (Jan. 30, 2016), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/whynot/2016/01/30/hillel-investment-advice/#2e0e477a6b55 
[https://perma.cc/N98U-VUCM]. 
 3 Robin Bradley Kar & Margaret Jane Radin, Pseudo-Contract and Shared Meaning Analysis, 
132 HARV. L. REV. 1135 (2019). 
 4 Id. at 1139–40 (citing Yannis Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & David R. Trossen, Does 
Anyone Read the Fine Print? Consumer Attention to Standard-Form Contracts, 43 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 1 (2014)).  
 5 Id. at 1167. 
  
2 HARVARD LAW REVIEW FORUM [Vol. 133:1 
plate text have plausibly contributed to an oral conversation that con-
tributes terms to a contract consistent with the presupposition that both 
parties were observing the cooperative norms that govern language use 
to form a contract?”6  If the answer is “No,” the boilerplate “should not 
be enforced.”7  Kar and Radin’s standard places particular emphasis on 
succinctness.  Plausibly contributing to an oral conversation where the 
drafter is observing the cooperative conversational norms requires the 
drafter “to say neither too much nor too little” given the shared purpose 
of the conversation.8 
Kar and Radin are asking important questions, and there is much to 
admire in their analysis.9  The past century has seen radical changes in 
the technologies for entering into contracts, including consumer con-
tracts.  If in the early twentieth century many worried about preprinted 
forms businesspeople never read,10 today we have shrinkwrap, click-
wrap, and browsewrap.  There is a good case that courts, legislatures, 
and regulators have not kept up — that the old rules of contract  
formation, construction, and enforcement are ill suited to these new 
technologies. 
But we worry that Kar and Radin’s proposed solution would, in 
many contexts, lead to a kind of one-legged contracting.  We do not 
understand Rabbi Hillel to be saying that the commentary is unim-
portant or might be dispensed with.  Indeed, the full quotation ends 
with an imperative: “The rest is commentary — [and now] go study.”11  
But as modern buyers, we are often like the impatient gentile demand-
ing to learn everything in just a few moments.  Whether we are standing 
at a rental car counter, enrolling to buy 99-cent songs from iTunes, or 
even closing on a mortgage, the vast majority of us want to contract 
quickly.  Because nondrafters’ conversational tolerance for details is ex-
tremely limited, in many contexts Kar and Radin’s enforcement stand-
ard would severely limit the length of contracts without regard to the 
substance of their terms.  Kar and Radin appear to view this as a good 
thing.  We are not so sure. 
Part I of this Response criticizes as arbitrary and essentializing Kar 
and Radin’s insistence of shared meaning as the core of contracting.  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 6 Id. 
 7 Id. 
 8 Id. at 1151. 
 9 See, e.g., id. at 1182–92 (criticizing Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott’s argument for textualism 
and identifying examples in which context evidence might improve the accuracy of interpretation 
in contracts between sophisticated parties); id. at 1196–203 (collecting doctrinal tools courts use to 
prevent adhesive contracts from overriding the parties’ actual communications, and emphasizing 
the potential power of Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 211(3)). 
 10 See, e.g., Nathan Isaacs, The Standardizing of Contracts, 27 YALE L.J. 34 (1917); Karl N. 
Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REV. 700 (1939). 
 11 Philologos, supra note 1. 
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Part II argues that even if shared meaning were the sine qua non of 
contracting, their proposal fails to achieve it because it does not assure 
that the terms would be “cooperatively communicated.”  Part III argues 
that the proposed enforcement standard would, in practice, severely 
limit freedom of contract and likely reduce consumer welfare. 
I. ESSENTIALIZING SHARED MEANING 
Kar and Radin criticize those who seek “to assimilate all boilerplate 
text to ‘contract’ so long as it is delivered with actual or merely con-
structive ‘notice’ to a party who agrees to a more basic transaction.”12 
The authors appropriately single out Judge Frank Easterbrook’s opin-
ion in Hill v. Gateway 200013 as a classic statement of this “assimilation-
ist” approach: “A contract need not be read to be effective; people who 
accept take the risk that the unread terms may in retrospect prove un-
welcome.”14 
Kar and Radin maintain that “assimilationist approaches have not 
yet offered a fully workable or coherent alternative to centering contract 
interpretation on the common meaning of the parties.”15  Their core 
criticism is that assimilationists fail to limit enforcement to terms coop-
eratively communicated to the buyers.16  “The premises of freedom of 
contract — and also freedom from contract — suppose parties with 
equal capacities to define and enter into only those terms that both agree 
offer expected gains for each.”17  The article abstract states that “actual 
agreement” is “required by core contract law principles.”18  If assent to 
communicated terms is the bedrock of valid contractual enforcement, 
assimilationist approaches must fail, as they call for enforcement of pre-
dictably unread, and hence uncommunicated and non-agreed-upon, 
terms. 
A distinctive feature of contractual obligations is that they are both 
voluntary and chosen.  Contractual obligations are voluntary in the 
sense that the parties must agree to them, unlike most duties found in 
tort or criminal law.  Contractual obligations are chosen in the sense 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 12 Kar & Radin, supra note 3, at 1139. 
 13 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 14 Kar & Radin, supra note 3, at 1143 n.19 (quoting Hill, 105 F.3d at 1148).  
 15 Id. at 1156; see also id. at 1143 (“Nor have assimilationists advanced any adequate normative 
theory for why contract formation by means of assumption of risk by noncognizant parties ought 
to replace traditional contract, with its basis in actual agreement with shared meaning.”). 
 16 Id. at 1139–40 (“Assimilationists assume that all boilerplate text serves the same essentially 
contractual function, and they do not recognize the critical difference between terms that parties 
cooperatively communicate and agree to during contract formation and the increasingly copious 
boilerplate text that is merely tacked onto that agreement but never read.”). 
 17 Id. at 1161 (emphasis added). 
 18 Id. at 1137; see also id. at 1139 (“[A]n actual agreement with common meaning is central to 
the normative justification of contract.”). 
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that the parties get to decide for themselves the content of the obliga-
tions.  This distinguishes contractual duties from those that attach, say, 
to a political office, military service, marriage, or a fiduciary — duties 
voluntarily acquired but difficult or impossible to alter.19 
It does not follow, however, that “[t]he premises of freedom of con-
tract” require that the parties actively choose, or even comprehend, all 
terms to which they agree.  If a contract is the whole of the legal rela-
tionship between the parties that results from formation, then contracts 
regularly include terms that the parties have not communicated and to 
which they have not “actually agreed.”  Default terms apply precisely 
when the parties have not reached an agreement to the contrary.  Man-
datory terms apply even in the face of the parties’ contrary agreement.  
And many rules of contract construction — contra proferentem, inter-
pretations favoring the public interest, formalities like “F.O.B.” or “as 
is” — look beyond what was actually communicated or the parties’ ac-
tual agreement.  Such nonchosen terms do not threaten freedom of con-
tract.  Although the parties have not agreed to them individually, they 
have assented to the transaction as a whole.  That assent, which renders 
contractual obligations voluntary if not all individually chosen, can do 
a lot of normative work.20 
This is not to deny the important differences between legislatively or 
judicially created default and mandatory terms and standard terms that 
one party drafts and gives to the other on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.  
There are reasons to scrutinize the latter that do not apply to the former.  
Our point is merely that the core principles of contract law do not obvi-
ously require actual agreement to or understanding of all terms.  The 
claim that choice of all terms is essential to contracting is not true to the 
phenomena. 
Kar and Radin level a separate, and to our minds even less persua-
sive, criticism of the so-called assimilationist approach: that it is “[l]in-
guistically [i]ndeterminate.”21  To explain why, they point to several ex-
amples of unread terms in the iTunes online terms and conditions, such 
as: “If you see content submitted to the Apple Music Service that does 
not comply with these Guidelines, [then] use the Report a Concern fea-
ture.”22  The authors treat the discovery of such provisions as strong 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 19 See Gregory Klass, What If Fiduciary Obligations Are Like Contractual Ones?, in 
CONTRACT, STATUS, AND FIDUCIARY LAW 93, 101–08 (Paul B. Miller & Andrew S. Gold eds., 
2016). 
 20 For two very different examples, see Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71 
FORDHAM L. REV. 627, 634–36 (2002) (argument based on an autonomy-based consent theory); 
and Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in Competitive Consumer Mar-
kets, 104 MICH. L. REV. 827, 833–34 (2006) (arguing that apparently one-sided unread terms can in 
fact enhance consumer welfare). 
 21 Kar & Radin, supra note 3, at 1160. 
 22 Id. at 1162. 
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evidence of the failure of the assimilationist approach — claiming that 
Judge Easterbrook’s position “start[s] to look strange” in light of them.23  
Kar and Radin’s argument is subtle, but we take the claim to be twofold.  
First, they emphasize that instructions like the above have the same if-
then structure as sentences that add terms, such as, “If you paint my 
house, then I will pay you $1000.”24  An exclusive focus on semantic 
meaning — “sentence meaning” — does not therefore differentiate be-
tween sentences that add terms and those that are mere instructions.25  
In order to mark the difference, one must recur to linguistic norms of 
cooperation, the very norms that, according to Kar and Radin, assimi-
lationists themselves ignore or reject.  Assimilationists have therefore 
failed to explain “how courts are supposed to translate boilerplate if-
then statements like these into ‘contract meanings.’”26  Second, the ex-
amples belie the assimilationist claim that “all boilerplate text found 
under the contemporary label of ‘terms and conditions’ is being assigned 
a ‘contract meaning’ and treated by everyone as adding ‘terms’ to a 
‘contract’ once a consumer clicks ‘I accept.’”27 
We find ourselves baffled by both claims.  As Kar and Radin observe 
in a footnote, when using “a fully ‘textualist’ or ‘four corners’ approach 
to interpretation, courts often do and must implicitly rely on conversa-
tional implicatures to identify even the ‘plain meaning’ of text.”28  Even 
the most textualist of courts regularly intone, a contractual writing 
should be “read as a whole to determine its purpose and intent.”29  It 
strikes us as fairly straightforward to differentiate between the instruc-
tions and terms in the iTunes terms and conditions, as illustrated by Kar 
and Radin’s own puzzlement at the idea that obvious instructions might 
be treated as terms.30  Doing so does not require applying the shared 
meaning analysis Kar and Radin advocate — focusing only on language 
that could have been communicated in an oral conversation.  Meaning 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. at 1163. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id.  
 27 Id. at 1165. 
 28 Id. at 1183 n.139. 
 29 W.W.W. Assocs., Inc. v. Giancontieri, 566 N.E.2d 639, 642 (N.Y. 1990); see also, e.g., Empire 
Props. Corp. v. Mfrs. Trust Co., 43 N.E.2d 25, 28 (N.Y. 1942) (“The meaning of a writing may be 
distorted where undue force is given to single words or phrases.  We read the writing as a whole.  
We seek to give to each clause its intended purpose in the promotion of the primary and dominant 
purpose of the contract.”). 
 30 See Kar & Radin, supra note 3, at 1164 (suggesting that trying to give contractual meaning to 
instructional provisions would lead to “ludicrous” and “absurd[]” results); id. at 1208 (noting with 
respect to provision, “You can disable an app’s access [to Apple Music] on your iOS device in Set-
tings,” and arguing “[n]o one would think that Apple had actually breached the resulting contract 
if its developers were, for instance, to come up with an easier and more user-friendly way to disable 
an app’s access without going to Settings and could therefore eliminate the Settings bar altogether 
in a useful software update”). 
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happens in nonconversational contexts too.  Identifying it requires 
simply making sense of words in the context in which they appear, read-
ing a document as a whole, and applying the principle of charity.31 
Nor do we understand the grounds on which Kar and Radin attrib-
ute to their opponents a “blanket assumption that all boilerplate text 
conveyed during contract formation must seek to add terms to a con-
tract.”32  We know of no theorist who makes such a claim.  Nor can we 
think of any reason why someone who advocates enforcing unread, or 
even unreadable terms, must assume that every word in a document 
labeled “terms and conditions” should designate a contract term. 
Perhaps Kar and Radin are concerned about the label “terms and 
conditions.”  They write: “Apple is offering a mere instruction for use 
even though the instruction is presented under the misleading label of 
‘terms and conditions.’”33  We grant that Apple’s lawyers could have 
chosen a more descriptive title.  But it is odd for Kar and Radin to 
complain that it is misleading.  As noted above, they too find it easy to 
differentiate between instructions and terms.  Nor do they point to any 
evidence of consumer confusion.  And we think there are good reasons 
to mix terms and instructions in a single document.  In a world where 
few nondrafters bother reading standard terms ex ante, it becomes all 
the more natural to include instructions to guide the subset of those who 
consult them ex post.  We do not expect new car buyers to read all of 
their owner’s manual before using the car.  Terms and conditions, like 
owner’s manuals, are often best consulted when particular problems 
arise.  Including instructions in them strikes us as not only unproblem-
atic, but beneficial. 
II. FAILING TO ASSURE SHARED MEANING 
We believe the core risk of adhesive contracts, including consumer 
contracts, is drafter overreach.  Knowing the nondrafting party is un-
likely to read, the drafter is tempted to include terms to which the non-
drafting party would object if they were brought to her attention — 
terms that are unfair or inefficient.  In addition to harming the non-
drafting party, the widespread use of such terms can also have negative 
social consequences — a case Radin has made forcefully elsewhere.34  
One finds in the law two nonexclusive approaches to addressing this 
risk.  The first, procedural approach attempts to secure consumer com-
prehension of terms, on the theory that consumers can be trusted to 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 31 See DONALD DAVIDSON, Radical Interpretation, in INQUIRIES INTO TRUTH AND 
INTERPRETATION: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 125 (2001). 
 32 Kar & Radin, supra note 3, at 1209; see also id. at 1208 (“[P]lacing noncontractual boilerplate 
text under a misleading label like ‘terms and conditions’ can only cause obfuscation.”). 
 33 Id. at 1165. 
 34 See, e.g., MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING 
RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW 33–51 (2013). 
  
2019] ONE-LEGGED CONTRACTING 7 
recognize unfair terms if they only know that they are there.  The sec-
ond, substantive approach relies on scrutiny of the content of the terms.  
That scrutiny might employ ex ante regulatory mechanisms such as 
black or grey list, or it might rely on ex post review against a standard 
such as substantive unconscionability. 
Kar and Radin themselves emphasize the risk of unfairness to non-
drafting parties.  To the extent that their proposed test seeks to address 
it, it would appear to represent a modified version of the procedural 
approach.  Their core premise is that “parties with equal capacities [will] 
define and enter into only those terms that both agree offer expected 
gains for each.”35  Unlike other procedural proposals, however, Kar and 
Radin do not advocate securing nondrafter comprehension of important 
boilerplate terms.  They view that project as hopeless.36  Instead, they 
would radically cut back the effective boilerplate language to that which 
could have been communicated in a conversation.37 
But the proposed “face-to-face conversation” test does not assure that 
enforcement is limited to terms the nondrafting party actually under-
stands.38  Kar and Radin recommend that with respect to disputed boil-
erplate text, courts ask the following question: 
Could this boilerplate text have plausibly contributed to an oral conversa-
tion that contributes terms to a contract consistent with the presupposition 
that both parties were observing the cooperative norms that govern lan-
guage use to form a contract? 
Any boilerplate text that meets this test falls within the correct boundary of 
parties’ actual agreement for a contract, and courts can rely on their  
ordinary linguistic intuitions to interpret the contract meaning of the text.  
Otherwise the boilerplate text is mere pseudo-contract, which does not con-
tribute to the common meaning of the parties and should not be enforced.39 
Although the above test uses the words “actual agreement,” it  
appears not to require that a term actually be communicated to the non-
drafting party — there is no expectation that the nondrafting party  
actually read the term.  All that is necessary is that it be conveyed in “a 
sufficiently cooperative manner” such that parties’ common meaning is 
created.40  Nor do Kar and Radin present any evidence that nondrafting 
parties are more likely to read and comprehend boilerplate text that 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 35 Kar & Radin, supra note 3, at 1161.  
 36 See id. at 1171–72 (citing OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU 
WANTED TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE 169 (2014)).  For a trenchant 
critique of Ben-Shahar and Schneider’s use of evidence and mode of argument, see Richard  
Craswell, Static Versus Dynamic Disclosures, and How Not to Judge Their Success or Failure, 88 
WASH. L. REV. 333 (2013). 
 37 See Kar & Radin, supra note 3, at 1172, 1175.  
 38 See id. at 1176–77. 
 39 Id. at 1167 (footnote omitted). 
 40 Id. at 1155. 
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passes their test.41  Although Kar and Radin criticize those who would 
enforce boilerplate terms, “so long as [the text] is delivered with actual 
or merely constructive ‘notice,’”42 their preferred rule in fact merely sets 
out a different, higher standard for what constitutes constructive notice.  
The test does not eliminate “the so-called ‘duty-to-read’” doctrine, which 
holds nondrafters to unread terms.  It merely limits which unread terms 
will be enforced.43 
We agree that the correct test cannot be actual agreement.  Limiting 
enforcement to terms that have been actually communicated or agreed 
upon (objectively considered) would wreak havoc on contract doctrine.  
As we noted above, many rules of contract construction — default 
terms, mandatory terms, contra proferentem, and so forth — generate 
terms in the absence of, and sometimes despite, the parties’ actual agree-
ment to them. 
But this causes us to wonder about the purposes and implications of 
the proposed test.  Whereas actual comprehension by a critical mass of 
nondrafters can, at least in theory, serve to discipline drafters,44 potential 
comprehension does not.  Without an argument that nondrafters are 
more likely to read terms that pass their proposed test, there is little 
reason to think that Kar and Radin’s proposal will address the risks 
adhesive contracts pose. 
If the test is meant to serve a purpose other than securing fair or 
efficient terms — if it comes from, say, a more abstract commitment to 
what freedom of contract requires — we wonder about its implications.  
What, for example, does it say about how the law establishes and com-
municates default terms?45  Does section 2-314 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code sufficiently convey the implied warranty of merchantability to 
make it part of the shared meaning of a contract for the sale of goods?46  
And according to the proposed test, the question is not whether individ-
ual sections of Article Two might have been effectively communicated 
in conversation, but whether all the enforceable terms could have been.  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 41 For a dramatic illustration of how difficult it can be to secure consumer comprehension, see 
Omri Ben-Shahar & Adam Chilton, Simplification of Privacy Disclosures: An Experimental Test, 
45 J. LEGAL STUD. 541 (2016) (finding that warning boxes highlighting terms many consumers 
might find important had little effect on consumer comprehension, decision making, or understand-
ing of their legal rights). 
 42 Kar & Radin, supra note 3, at 1139. 
 43 Id. at 1182 (“If courts are interested in discerning the common meaning of the parties and 
correctly identifying the scope of their actual agreements, then the so-called ‘duty to read’ should 
be limited to text that was cooperatively communicated.”). 
 44 For a classic statement of this claim, see Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in 
Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 
630, 643–46 (1979). 
 45 Kar and Radin acknowledge the existence of default rules and other noninterpretive rules of 
construction.  See Kar & Radin, supra note 3, at 1138 n.2.  They do not explain, however, why those 
rules should be exempt from their proposed test. 
 46 U.C.C. § 2-314 (AM. LAW. INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002). 
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Clearly the default terms contained in Article Two, plus the raft of ju-
dicial decisions comprising the common law of contracts, fail that test.  
But if unread and uncooperatively conveyed provisions of the Code and 
relevant caselaw can become part of the parties’ shared meaning, why 
can substantively reasonable boilerplate terms not also become part of 
the parties’ shared meaning? 
To repeat, we do not mean to assimilate terms drafted by one party 
and given to the other on a take-it-or-leave-it basis to legislatively or 
judicially established defaults.  But the conceptual apparatus Kar and 
Radin use has implications they do not address.  Or to put the same 
point a different way, their conceptual apparatus does not capture what 
is truly worrisome about contracts of adhesion — the risks of opportun-
ism and unfairness that come with terms drafted by one party and given 
to the other on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.  We would do better by focus-
ing on those risks, rather than the form in which nonsalient terms are 
provided. 
III.  CRYPTO-MANDATORY RULES AND CONSUMER WELFARE 
Kar and Radin claim that their approach “is not a form of paternal-
ism or market regulation.”47  We disagree.  In fact, their approach would 
prevent buyers from taking a reasonable risk on unread boilerplate.  The 
authors analogously argue that “utilizing shared meaning analysis would 
not interfere with freedom of contract.”48  This claim borders on the 
disingenuous.  Although shared meaning analysis does not impose spe-
cific, substantive mandatory rules, its procedural mandate has im-
portant substantive consequences.  It is therefore best understood as a 
covert or crypto-mandatory rule. 
First, although there are circumstances in which parties might rea-
sonably want to take on the risk of unread terms, Kar and Radin’s pro-
posal would deny them the ability to do so.  Technological changes have 
radically expanded the use of standard terms.  But technology has also 
expanded the possibility of reputational disciplining of sellers’ boiler-
plate.  A “bug me not” consumer renting from Avis or licensing from 
Apple might rationally prefer a streamlined contracting process, know-
ing that social media would likely uncover and bring to bear public 
pressure on any untoward terms.  Assuming the risk is all the more 
reasonable when a buyer takes into account the protection afforded by 
the doctrine of unconscionability and other doctrines that limit the en-
forceability of substantively unreasonable standard terms — doctrines 
that Kar and Radin themselves helpfully collect and summarize.49 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 47 Kar & Radin, supra note 3, at 1172. 
 48 Id. at 1178. 
 49 See id. at 1197–202. 
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Second, Kar and Radin give insufficient attention to the possibility 
that terms that do not pass their proposed test can increase aggregate 
consumer welfare.  Even if a subset of contractors ends up being bound 
by terms to which they would never have agreed, it is still possible that 
enforcing unread terms produces transaction cost savings that on net 
increase nondrafter welfare.  Judge Easterbrook in Hill memorably cap-
tured just this idea: 
Cashiers cannot be expected to read legal documents to customers before 
ringing up sales.  If the staff at the other end of the phone for direct-sales 
operations such as Gateway’s had to read the four-page statement of terms 
before taking the buyer’s credit card number, the droning voice would anes-
thetize rather than enlighten many potential buyers.  Others would hang up 
in a rage over the waste of their time. . . .  Customers as a group are better 
off when vendors skip costly and ineffectual steps such as telephonic reci-
tation, and use instead a simple approve-or-return device.50 
Standard terms save drafters money, which in competitive markets 
can benefit nondrafters in the form of lower prices.  A nondrafter might 
find it in her interest to roll the dice on being among a majority of those 
that receive that benefit.  Again, Kar and Radin’s approach would pre-
vent her from doing so. 
Third, the proposed test could prevent terms that directly benefit 
consumers.  In practice, the “face-to-face conversation” test would work 
as a complexity-limiting device.  Drafters attempting to contract around 
default rights and duties would be severely limited in the number of 
provisions that could be altered — perhaps to two or three.  The shared 
meaning approach would therefore result in a regime in which almost 
all default terms become mandatory.  One suspects that this complexity-
limiting feature is an intended consequence of Kar and Radin’s enter-
prise — a feature, not a bug.  But the proposed test would also deny 
enforcement to boilerplate terms that are unexpectedly generous relative 
to the legal default or to the buyer’s beliefs.51  And sometimes complex-
ity is necessary to secure real benefits for the nondrafting party. 
Consider the margin rate currently offered by Interactive Brokers, 
an electronic trading platform.52  Whereas at this writing Fidelity and 
Schwab were charging 9.32% interest to customers buying stock on mar-
gin, Interactive Brokers was charging an interest rate of just 3.90%.53  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 50 Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1149 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 51 See Ian Ayres & Alan Schwartz, The No-Reading Problem in Consumer Contract Law, 66 
STAN. L. REV. 545, 578, 583 n.94, 598 n.140, 605 (2014) (discussing examples where a majority of 
consumers expected less favorable terms than those included in the actual agreement). 
 52 One of us has extolled the use of Interactive Brokers.  See IAN AYRES & BARRY NALEBUFF, 
LIFECYCLE INVESTING: A NEW, SAFE, AND AUDACIOUS WAY TO IMPROVE THE 
PERFORMANCE OF YOUR RETIREMENT PORTFOLIO (2010). 
 53 See Online Brokers, INTERACTIVE BROKERS, https://www.interactivebrokers.com/en/ 
index.php?f=1340 [https://perma.cc/7E38-VLSX]. 
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One reason that its margin rate is so much lower is that the company 
has contractually dispensed with the tradition of “margin calls” after 
prespecified drops in the margined stock’s price (where brokers would 
telephonically call their margin customers and give them the option of 
adding additional funds to their account to avoid involuntary liquida-
tion of the margined position).54  Under Kar and Radin’s proposal, a 
seller who wanted to engage in such contractual innovation would face 
substantial risk: a court might later conclude that the language it used 
to describe this term could not have plausibly contributed to an oral 
conversation under cooperative norms. 
Kar and Radin ominously claim that “market forces have begun to 
interact with assimilationist legal doctrine to create powerful incentives 
for businesses systematically to mislead consumers.”55  To be sure, boil-
erplate at times hurts nondrafters.  The low-salience, “shrouded” pricing 
of back-end fees is a vivid example.56  But the implied claim that assim-
ilationist enforcement hurts nondrafters more than it helps them is un-
substantiated.  The enforcement of boilerplate that meets the ex post 
fairness test of unconscionability and associated doctrines, as well as the 
disciplinary reputational tests of social media, leaves considerable room 
for contractual creativity.  That is not to say that the current protections 
are enough.  Where there are systematic problems, for example, ex ante 
regulation of terms should perhaps step in, as the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau attempted to do with respect to class arbitration 
waivers.57  A contractual regime that imposed the further limits of 
shared meaning analysis, however, would be a world in which innova-
tive, contractually structured products like Interactive Brokers, Uber, 
and Airbnb would be less likely to exist. 
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 54 See INTERACTIVE BROKERS, DISCLOSURE OF RISKS OF MARGIN TRADING 1 (Mar. 10, 
2015), https://gdcdyn.interactivebrokers.com/Universal/servlet/Registration.formSampleView?file= 
registration_1/margin_trading_risk_disclosure.html [https://perma.cc/B2SB-FQEL] (“You should 
understand that pursuant to the IB Margin Agreement, IB generally will not issue margin calls, 
that IB will not credit your account to meet intraday margin deficiencies, and that IB generally will 
liquidate positions in your account in order to satisfy margin requirements without prior notice to 
you and without an opportunity for you to choose the positions to be liquidated or the timing or 
order of liquidation.”). 
 55 Kar & Radin, supra note 3, at 1196. 
 56 See Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Infor-
mation Suppression in Competitive Markets, 121 Q.J. ECON. 505, 506–08 (2006); see also Sendhil 
Mullainathan et al., The Market for Financial Advice: An Audit Study 11, 14, 17 (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17929, 2012), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2028263 
[https://perma.cc/K7UV-X9JR]. 
 57 Arbitration Agreements, 81 Fed. Reg. 32,830 (May 24, 2016) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1040 
(2017)), rendered ineffective by Pub. L. No. 115-74, 131 Stat. 1243 (2017). 
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CONCLUSION 
Almost half a century ago, Professor Arthur Leff suggested that we 
think of consumer contracts not as agreements, but as things that busi-
nesses market to the public, which like an automobile or other techno-
logical good, a person might purchase without fully understanding how 
it works.58  Like Kar and Radin, Leff argued that it was a category 
mistake to lump such consumer contracts of adhesion together with fully 
negotiated contracts.  But Leff’s solution was very different.  Rather 
than excising what was not part of the actual agreement, Leff recom-
mended regulating consumer contracts like any other consumer prod-
uct.59  Viewed from this perspective, Kar and Radin’s proposal looks 
like a form of Luddism.  Rather than regulating complex adhesive con-
tracts for fairness, safety, and social benefit, Kar and Radin would lop 
off that which is too complex.  The equivalent in the product safety 
realm would be requiring auto manufacturers to go back to the horse 
and buggy. 
In the end, Kar and Radin’s analysis seems too divorced from real-
world consequences.  They choose formal abstractions — and at times 
moving poetry60 — over practical policy analysis.  The decisions con-
cerning whether and when to enforce boilerplate text can impact social 
welfare.  We too worry that buyers would not have purchased many 
items if they had known the details of unread terms.  But we also won-
der whether different enforcement rules might more effectively harness 
competition to produce better offers.  What we want are rules that, on 
net, both increase consumer autonomy and enhance the gains of trade.  
We believe Kar and Radin’s shared-meaning approach is too indirect a 
route to get us there. 
 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 58 Arthur Allen Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131 (1970). 
 59 “When things are too dangerous or too worthless the government does directly intervene. 
There is no reason why that intervention should not take place as directly with respect to contracty 
things.”  Id. at 155.  This is not to say that we agree with all of Leff’s regulatory approaches, such 
as the use of warning labels, id. at 153–55.  Our understanding of which regulatory techniques work 
has grown since 1970. 
 60 See, e.g., Kar & Radin, supra note 3, at 1208 (“The tree of contract is getting lost in an ex-
panding forest of pseudo-contract, and the forest is being mistaken for the tree.”). 
